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New book: Government Lawyers in the United Kingdom: Between Law and Politics
I am happy to say that on 26 November my new book “Government Lawyers in the United Kingdom” will be published with Hart. The book focuses on topics I have been interested in for several years; namely, how the executive branch internally structures the way it receives legal advice; how respect for legality is made concrete and practically institutionalized within the executive branch; how legal advice can act as a Janus-faced source of executive constraint and empowerment; and how different design choices and cultural norms profoundly shape the extent to which government lawyers, as a class of constitutional actor, restrain or facilitate public power. I am also interested in the ways in which a polity’s system of government lawyering can contribute to, or hinder, good governance for the common good. In what follows, I offer a short introduction to the main topics of the book, in the off chance it might be of interest to some of our readers. I am conscious, of course, that this work is a good deal more “wonky” or “Dryasdust” than we usually feature at the New Digest. But for those few who might find it of interest, the book can be found here: https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/government-lawyers-in-the-united-kingdom-9781509989270/ Introduction to Government Lawyers in the United Kingdom: Between Law and Politics (Hart, 2026) Public lawyers in the UK rightly devote enormous attention to the exercise of public power. We study judicial review, statutory interpretation, parliamentary sovereignty, devolution, human rights law, and so on. All of this concerns how public power is generated, channelled, and constrained. But despite this focus, we spend far less time examining the most powerful branch of government—the executive—especially its internal workings. That includes the actors and mechanisms that shape executive action. Within the executive, there is a group that have been particularly neglected in the literature: government lawyers. Over the last several decades, there have been only a handful of monographs and a few dozen articles on the subject. Some of that work is excellent, but much of it is now outdated, and none of the contemporary work systemic or comprehensive. The field is not entirely terra nullius, but it is certainly not occupied by a bustling town. One reason I wrote this book, then, was to address what I see as a significant gap in our understanding of how the executive is internally constituted and regulated, how it relates to law and legality in practice, and what role government lawyers play in how it exercises power. Who are our government lawyers? What does that system look like today? The vast majority of domestic legal advice—well over 90 percent—is provided by around 2,500 civil servant lawyers in the Government Legal Department, headed by the Treasury Solicitor. This is an office with origins in the seventeenth century that expanded in size as the Attorney and Solicitor General became unable to handle the sheer volume of government legal work. These lawyers are organised into advisory teams aligned with individual government departments. They are, in effect, the front line of government lawyering. For international law, the primary source of advice is the Legal Directorate in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. It has roughly 100 lawyers. Where specialist input is required, where legal questions are particularly tricky or raise the prospect of litigation—or where officials seek a second opinion—government lawyers may turn to panel counsel. These are barristers appointed by the Attorney General through a competitive process to undertake government work. This is a distinctive feature of the UK system: a considerable amount of specialist legal advice is provided by private practitioners, who may also act against the government in other cases. For more significant or contested issues, matters can be escalated. Advice may be sought from the Treasury Solicitor, or from the First Treasury Counsel—the so-called “Treasury Devil”—a senior barrister who works exclusively for the government for a fixed term. At the highest level sit the Law Officers: the Attorney General and Solicitor General. They deal with the most important, sensitive, and politically salient legal questions. They are also the only genuinely political lawyers in the system. They are ministers, drawn from Parliament, and when they advise, that advice constitutes the government’s definitive legal position. Running alongside this advisory structure is the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel—an elite group of around 50 lawyers responsible for drafting primary legislation. They too may refer issues to the Attorney General where necessary. That, in outline, is the current ecosystem of government lawyering. The structure of the book It opens with a discussion of its aims, my reasons for writing, the methodology, and the limits of its scope. The main limitation is that I focus on lawyers advising the UK Government and its core departments. I do not examine devolved governments or their internal legal arrangements. I also focus on advisory and drafting work—the civil side of government lawyering. I do not deal in detail with prosecutorial functions carried out through bodies like the Crown Prosecution Service or the Director of Public Prosecutions. The book is in large measure an exploratory work, mapping underexamined constitutional terrain. Accordingly, it makes a range of claims along the way. Some are descriptive, and aimed at capturing how government lawyering works in practice. Some are constitutional—identifying conventions that structure the relationship between lawyers and officials. And some are normative, particularly toward the end, where I assess the contribution government lawyers make to constitutional government. It is, in short, more a fox than a hedgehog of a book. Chapter 2 provides a brief history of the relationship between law, lawyers, and executive power in the English—later UK—constitution. It also sketches how the current institutional system of government lawyering emerged. We often say that the Crown is bound by the law of the land. That is true enough. But how has that principle been realised in practice? Most monarchs were not trained lawyers. They did not have law reports on their desks. Some—James I, for example—saw themselves as capable jurists. But most relied on legal professionals to explain the limits of their authority and how to pursue their objectives within those limits. This chapter shows that government lawyering has a deep constitutional history. Government lawyers did not suddenly appear in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries. In one form or another, they have always been present. It traces who monarchs relied on for advice, and how certain offices—most notably the Attorney General and Solicitor General—rose in prominence and came to eclipse other sources of legal advice. The chapter then turns to the development of the current system. Like much of British public law, this system evolved incrementally, rather than being designed from first principles. I give a series of vignettes showing how the system we have took shape. In addition to telling the story of how we have the system we have today, another point of the chapter is to show that today’s government lawyers are heirs to a long constitutional tradition. They have long had to navigate a set of enduring tensions: between advancing the executive’s objectives and stating the law faithfully; between loyalty to ministers and commitment to broader notions of constitutional propriety and principle. After Chapter 2, the book turns to its core: a sustained analysis of how legal advice is produced and used within government. Chapter 11, toward the end, deals with legislative drafting. The greater focus on advisory work reflects not greater importance, but greater complexity. Drafting is equally significant but more structured and therefore easier to describe in a more compressed way. Chapters 3 to 6 examine the main institutional actors I have just introduced: the Government Legal Department, the Legal Directorate of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the barristers on the Attorney General’s panels, and the Law Officers. These chapters go into what may, depending on your taste, seem either like rich detail or dense description. But I think the detail is necessary. There is no comprehensive contemporary treatment of these actors: how they are organised, how they are internally structured, their professional ethos, their sense of role morality and place in the constitution, and how they all interact with one another. These are important constitutional actors, and so it matters that we know who they are and how they are organised. Those chapters, then, are intended to be rich in detail and information so that we can have good answers to such questions. Chapters 7 and 8 examine how the system of government lawyering works in practice: how legal advice is sought, how it is formulated, and how it is communicated within government. I also look at how legal materials and sources are analysed by government lawyers, how legal risk is assessed and presented, how disagreements over legal advice are resolved, and how second or third opinions are obtained where officials want them. I think readers of these chapters will come away with a much sharper picture of how government lawyering operates in practice. In my view, several features stand out from examining the procedures and substantive principles that govern their work. First, most of the legal advice is not given by the Attorney General or the Treasury Devil—the figures one is most likely to see mentioned in the press. It is given by civil servant lawyers in the Government Legal Department. They are very much the foot soldiers of government lawyering, the rock on which the overall system is built. Second, the legal advice process is highly iterative. It is highly collaborative and deeply embedded in policy-making from a very early stage. The back-and-forth between government lawyers and policy officials does not happen only at the end of the policy process, when legal sign-off is sought for an already settled policy. It happens from the beginning. Policy is shaped by legal considerations from the outset. The process of generating advice is also highly collaborative. It is rarely the product of a single mind but will have input from several actors. The rules concerning the escalation of legal questions, when it should be referred to a more senior source of advice, or when it should go to the very top, to the Law Officers, are largely unwritten. But they are nonetheless generally well understood and internalised by government lawyers. It is also understood that any government lawyer can go directly to the law officers with an issue, without permission of their relevant minister. This is very rare but seen as an important safeguard. The advice of the Law Officers has unquestioned primacy within government. I argue that there is a constitutional convention that it cannot be sidestepped. Once the Law Officers decide a legal question, that is the government’s legal position. The government cannot go elsewhere. It cannot forum-shop once the issue has reached the Law Officers. I also argue that there is a constitutional convention that if the Law Officers advise that there is no respectable legal basis for a proposed course of action in domestic law, the government cannot proceed. Paradoxically, however, despite the unquestioned primacy of Law Officers’ advice, there is no sophisticated or well-developed system for treating their past advice as internal precedent for government. There are a few domains in which something like precedent operates—war powers, European Union matters, and devolution—but in most areas the authority of advice is time-bound. In some respects, it stays with the incumbent office-holder and does not travel far beyond their time in office. That contrasts with systems such as that of the United States and how the opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel are treated within the executive branch. Substantively, government lawyers approach legal analysis through a combination of a court-centred approach and a risk-based approach. It is risk-based in the sense that government lawyers do not present their opinions like courts. They do not simply say: this is my best professional judgment of what the law is, your policy does not match it, and therefore it is unlawful. That is not how they operate. To be sure, their starting point is to ask: what would a competent court make of this issue? What is the best view of the law? That is their fixed point for analysing legal materials. Around that fixed point, however, analysis then turns to the legal risk associated with alternative arguments. You have the best view of the law in mind—but what about the alternative arguments that support the policy? How persuasive are they? What are the risks involved? Can we say there is a 50% chance the legal arguments for the policy will be accepted? 40%? These are their bread-and-butter questions. So they combine elements of both approaches. They do not merely ask whether there is some reasonable argument available to support the government’s position. But nor do they simply identify what they take to be the single best view of the law and insist that only this can be acted upon as a legal basis for action. Government lawyers are encouraged and trained to be constructive, solution-oriented, and practically minded. They want to help the government achieve its objectives by suggesting ways of making policy more legally robust. But it must be stressed that they are not trying to develop a separate executive jurisprudence. They are not departmentalists, to use a term much in vogue in constitutional theory. The anchor of their analysis remains what a competent court would decide. In that sense, they work within a horizon of judicial supremacy over what the law is and requires. I also highlight that there is very little evidence that government lawyers are pressured to slant their advice, or that they would yield to such pressure if it were applied. Respect for the independence of their professional judgment is deeply embedded within government. That applies not only to civil servant lawyers and panel counsel, but also to the Law Officers. The Law Officers have both legal and political functions, but there is vanishingly little evidence that they succumb to political bias or are subject to pressure, even in moments of acute political difficulty or high stakes for the Prime Minister. I also challenge the idea that government lawyers, as a class of public servants, are excessively risk-averse or unduly cautious. More often, I think, the real risk aversion lies with the officials who receive the advice. These officials may be told that there is a respectable legal basis for a policy, but also that there are serious litigation risks. A Government lawyer might say that we have a legal argument that is 40 per cent likely to be upheld and 60 per cent likely to fail. Officials may simply not want to run that risk. So the real caution often lies there. At the same time, government lawyers are operating in an environment of much greater legal uncertainty than they did several decades ago, owing to developments such as the Human Rights Act 1998 and the broader expansion in both the grounds and intensity of judicial review. This makes it unsurprising if they are regularly identifying a range of legal risks. But the choice to remove the sources of these legal risks can only lie with ministers and with Parliament. Chapter 9 then considers the impact of legal advice: the weight given to it in executive decision-making. This was a difficult chapter to write, because it is notoriously hard to pin down how much weight decision-makers actually give to legal advice, especially where it appears to conflict with their first-order policy objectives. I do not attempt anything like an empirical or quantitative account. My account is impressionistic and suggestive. It is built from anecdote, biography, and narrative accounts offered by both officials and government lawyers. That is a limitation. But I also think the evidence displays such consistency, over time and across different actors, that it points to a real cultural and political phenomenon: namely, that law and legality are taken very seriously within the United Kingdom government. I think there is good evidence that there is a standing approach within government whereby, if government lawyers say there is no respectable legal basis for a policy, the government will not proceed. What usually happens instead is that the policy is abandoned, modified to make it more legally robust, or the issue is escalated to more senior sources of advice, until it reaches the Law Officers. And when the Law Officers advise that a policy is unlawful in domestic law, I think there is a convention that the government will not proceed. It understands itself to be constitutionally bound. Where the issue concerns international law, the position is more complicated. I do not think there is an equivalent convention, because there are too many examples of governments proceeding, with the blessing of the Attorney General, in circumstances where the legal basis is contested. But I do think there is a strong presumption against proceeding where the Attorney advises that there is no respectable basis in international law. One point I am at pains to stress in the book is that the work of government lawyers should not merely be seen as a constraint on executive power. That is certainly an important aspect of what they do, but it is not the whole picture. The work of government lawyers is also critical to enabling the effective deployment of public power by the executive. It is critical in several respects. Legal advice, for one thing, helps clarify what the executive can lawfully do. In a specialised and highly complex modern society, the law constitutes a domain of semi-autonomous discourse and practice. Government lawyers possess the expertise necessary to enable the executive to navigate this domain—to understand the extent of its powers, how far those powers can be pushed, and, critically, to help transform governmental will, preferences, and policy aims into legally effective decisions, orders, rules, bills, statutes, and so forth. In a constitutional system such as that of the United Kingdom, where there is a strong cultural premium placed on legality and an expectation of lawful conduct, that form of legal validation—the ability to say that one’s position rests on a respectable legal basis articulated by professional legal advisers—is essential to political legitimacy and credibility. The work of government lawyers, in these ways sense, has a distinctly power-generating quality. Chapter 10 examines the confidentiality and privilege associated with government legal advice. It considers the tight control that government can exercise over the advice it receives. I broadly accept the justification for maintaining confidentiality in respect of the full legal advice. Preserving a strong measure of confidentiality allows the executive to legally stress-test its policies and helps to avoid timidity, excessive risk aversion, and indecision, by ensuring that ideas can be rigorously examined in private before being exposed to parliamentary scrutiny. At the same time, there are clear risks associated with a policy of total opacity in respect of legal advice. These risks are documented in the chapter. The central argument of the chapter, however, is my revisionist account of the dominant understanding of what is known as the Law Officers’ Convention—namely, the circumstances in which the advice of the Law Officers may be disclosed outside government. Governments have increasingly asserted to Parliament that the convention not only prohibits disclosure of the full terms of Law Officers’ advice, but also extends to the gist or summary of that advice, and even to the fact that advice was given at all—save in the most exceptional circumstances. My argument is that this account is far too broad and unduly restrictive of parliamentary scrutiny and debate. The better reading of constitutional practice is that the scope of the convention is considerably narrower. There is, in my view, a strong and justifiable convention against disclosing the full terms of the advice—the actual memorandum, email, or record of advice. However, constitutional practice and history do not support the existence of any constitutional bar on disclosing either the fact that advice was given or the broad terms of that advice. What the government has here is a permissive power to withhold or disclose this information, a straightforward privilege, one that is not contingent on needing exceptional justification to waive. Accordingly, parliamentarians act entirely with constitutionally proper when they seek disclosure of the fact or general content of legal advice, in order to hold government to account on contentious matters. The chapter therefore seeks both to outline the law governing legal professional privilege and to challenge some of the more expansive orthodoxies surrounding the convention. Chapter 11 offers an account of the various roles and responsibilities played by government lawyers in the legislative process—from the initial formulation of policy, through the conversion of policy into a bill, to the bill’s passage through Parliament and its enactment as a statute. I examine the role played by actors already encountered, such as the Government Legal Department and the Law Officers, but place particular emphasis on the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, who are the most prominent and important government lawyers in the legislative process. These lawyers are essential to the government’s ability to exercise public power in areas such as raising taxes, appropriating revenue, and altering the law of the land—each of which requires ministers to act through statutory authority created via a highly specialised legislative process. If statutes and regulations are to have their intended legal and practical effect, they must be drafted with precision. They must use the right words in the right order, be intelligible to those tasked with implementing them—such as officials and judges—and cohere with the existing body of law and its canons, presumptions and so on. Parliamentary Counsel are therefore indispensable as a specialist cadre whose expertise lies in translating the executive’s policy intentions, normative preferences, and ideological commitments into legally effective legislative form. They are a critical source of governmental power. At the same time, there is an important sense in which Parliamentary Counsel also channel—and at times limit—the exercise of governmental power. They do so by shaping the form and mode through which executive will is legally expressed in statute. In our constitution, there is a very longstanding tradition within the Office of embedding rule of law values into drafting practice. In practical terms, this includes a presumption against facilitating retroactive legislation; against rapid commencements that deprive individuals of the opportunity to understand the new legal position; against the use of vague language in criminal offences; and against conferring broad Henry VIII powers—namely, powers enabling ministers to amend primary legislation by statutory instrument. The institutional authority of the Office means that when Parliamentary Counsel raise concerns that a proposal conflicts with rule of law values, that pushback is taken seriously. While not always determinative, it is often influential and frequently prevails. Chapter 12 concludes the book by offering a normative evaluation of the work of government lawyers in the United Kingdom. The account is broadly positive. The book argues that the work of government lawyers can be understood as an institutional and practical instantiation of the United Kingdom’s longstanding commitment to legality and the rule of law. As noted, Parliamentary Counsel have long contributed to this commitment by shaping legislation in accordance with rule of law values, thereby channelling and constraining the exercise of governmental power. Respect for legality is also reflected in the deep integration of government lawyers into the policymaking process, the protection of their independence and non-partisanship, and the weight accorded to their advice within executive deliberation. Government lawyers are therefore central to what might be described as the executive’s practice of constitutional self-restraint: the internal organisation of government in a manner that promotes lawful and constitutionally attentive decision-making. At the same time, government lawyers are also essential to the executive’s ability to exercise public power effectively in pursuit of the common good. Legal reasoning about the scope and limits of governmental power is highly technical and requires mastery of legal sources and methods—statutes, prerogative powers, regulations, conventions, and precedent. Their specialised expertise enables lawyers to help the government to navigate the demands of the law and translate policy into legally authoritative and constitutionally legitimate forms—into legally valid political orders, decisions, and statutes. This is the power-generating dimension of their role. In conclusion, government lawyers operate at the intersection of law and politics. To fulfil their constitutional role, they must respond to demands arising from both domains. They must respect the integrity of the law and their professional obligations, while also assisting the government of the day in realizing its political objectives. The system of government lawyering in the United Kingdom contributes to good governance by cultivating lawyers capable of maintaining this delicate balance—between enabling the effective use of public power and ensuring that such power is exercised lawfully and in accordance with constitutional principle; between advancing governmental aims and providing candid, independent legal advice that may not always align with political preference. So long as this balance is maintained, government lawyers remain a critical component of good governance within the United Kingdom’s constitutional order.
Truth and Politics in the Age of Post-Truth
Get E-International Relations delivered to your inbox, free of charge. As you sign up, consider becoming a paid subscriber, or make a donation, to support our work. Subscribe This is an excerpt from Global Politics in a Post-Truth Era. You can download the book free of charge from E-International Relations. The term post-truth is by now so ubiquitous in describing the state of politics in the Western world and even beyond that the most pressing issue of the day appears to be about making democracy work in the era of post-truth rather than questioning the normalisation of the term itself in the first place. The critical turning point appeared to have occurred in 2016 when the term was chosen by the Oxford English Dictionary as ‘The Word of the Year.’ On its website, the Dictionary notes the transformation of post-truth from ‘being a peripheral term to being a mainstay in political commentary and connects ‘the spike in frequency’ directly with the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom and the election of Donald J. Trump in the United States – both occurring in 2016. Paired with the noun ‘politics,’ post-truth is defined as an adjective ‘relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief.’ The Oxford English Dictionary traces the first use of the term to a 1992 essay in The Nation by the playwright Steve Tesich as he reflected on the 1980s Iran-Contra scandal and the 1990–91 Gulf War: We are rapidly becoming prototypes of a people that totalitarian monsters could only drool about in their dreams. All the dictators up to now have had to work hard at suppressing the truth. We, by our actions, are saying that this is no longer necessary, that we have acquired a spiritual mechanism that can denude truth of any significance. In a very fundamental way we, as a free people, have freely decided that we want to live in some post-truth world (Tesich 1992, 13; emphasis added). He then continued, The Gulf War is over but the war at home goes on. The gulf between rich and destitute widens – between those of us who live in a modern post-industrial nation and those of us who live in the Third World countries of our inner cities. The present administration’s response to this internal crisis has shifted from benign to malignant neglect. The current levels of misery and decomposition of our cities and the economic gulags of our ghettos are acceptable. Since there is only so much hope to go around, there is a freeze on hope. The have-nots have now been reclassified as never-will-haves (Tesich 1992, 13). In the context of Tesich’s essay, truth includes both facts, as in what happens, and ‘moral absolutes,’ as in the ‘self-evident truths mentioned in our Constitution’ (Tesich 1992, 14). Together, these two notions of truth entail the obligation to both act and react. The two passages cited above show that even in the early post-Cold War years, Tesich was already deeply concerned that the American people are neither prepared to act on truth nor react to truth that is disconcerting, or what he calls ‘bad news’ (Tesich 1992, 12). Accordingly, Tesich’s insight as captured by the term post-truth is not that truth is irrelevant to what we know, but rather it is irrelevant to how we act. In contrast, ‘post-truth politics,’ as defined by Oxford as a term that pitches ‘objective facts’ against ‘emotion and personal belief’ such that the latter appears to have overtaken the former in shaping ‘public opinion’ and thereby, democratic politics. When Tesich’s post-truth politics and its current usage are juxtaposed, the two are in fact not identical in terms of what truth is and how it relates to politics. Against such consideration, this chapter provides a critical survey of selected historical events and theoretical considerations for the purpose of gaining a more nuanced understanding of the relation between truth and politics. Truth and Language One notable impact of post-truth politics is that language is being overtly deployed as a political weapon not only by politicians and those in power, but among the general population. It seems that once facts are irrelevant to the validity of what is being said, language becomes the platform for an all-out political contest in which what is said is no more than an act of will expressed as an assertion of power and/or an exercise in defiance. As early as in the writings of Thucydides (460–400 BCE), the vulnerability of logos – which is the human capacity for rational discourse in tumultuous times – was already noted. Thucydides belonged to a school of Greek thought which maintained that language is conventional and that the association between name and things is a result of ‘human use and habit’ rather than ‘nature or divine dispensation’ (Connor 1984, 99). The conventional nature of language means that it is incapable of providing its users with any independent criteria for judgement. In Thucydides’ study of the Peloponnesian War (431–405 BCE), the subversion of logos as seen in the manipulation of language was introduced through his account of the civil war in Corcyra (Thucydides 1972, 236-245). The war first broke out in 427 BCE between the pro-Athenian democratic faction and the pro-Spartan oligarchic faction before it spread to the rest of the Greek world. There was a general breakdown of law and order, resulting in extreme violence and death. Language underwent changes that were reflective of the events of the time. The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) translated Thucydides’ description of the situation as follows: The received value of names imposed for signification of things, was changed into arbitrary. For inconsiderate boldness, was counted true-hearted manliness: provident deliberation, a handsome fear: modesty, the cloak of cowardice: to be wise in everything, to be lazy in everything... he that had been so provident as not to need to do the one or the other, was said to be a dissolver of society, and one that stood in fear of his adversary. In brief, he that could outstrip another in the doing of an evil act, or that could persuade another thereto that never meant it, was commended (Hobbes 1839–1845, 8: 348; Thucydides 1972, 242-243). What concerned Thucydides most was that the meanings of words are no more than linguistic conventions that require logos to support them. The Corcyrean civil war was a reminder that such capacity cannot be assumed. This is why history understood as an authentic account of what happens matters. Guided by logos, the historian’s task is ‘the search after truth’, which is established through ‘the absence of the fabulous,’ including ‘the rejection of myth and unverifiable stories’ (de Jonge 2017, 2). Thus, history plays an important role in facilitating the stability of language – without which distinctions and judgements cannot be rendered communicable. Just like Thucydides, Hobbes was a nominalist who subscribed to the view that there is no inherent meaning to words. Hobbes’ state of nature, where there is no common authority, is precisely one in which distinctions cannot be made. As Hobbes put it, there is ‘no Mine and Thine distinct’ nor is there distinction between ‘the notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice’ (1968, 188; emphasis in original). This is clearly an unsustainable condition for everyone. Behind Hobbes’ famous words that life in the state of nature is ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’ is his uncompromising argument for the ‘Leviathan’, which is described by the late American political theorist, Sheldon Wolin (1922–2015), as the ‘sovereign definer’ (Hobbes 1968, 186; Wolin 2004, 238–243). Accordingly, the social contract is importantly a ‘linguistic contract’ that binds all parties to ‘general names agreed upon’ (Peters 1979, 125; Hobbes 1968, 111). Through Thucydides and Hobbes, we can identify a line of thinking that sees politics as a contestation over the use of language, which is based on shared conventions and norms. Thus understood, politics is not a collective quest for the true nature of our being or an epistemological exercise in pursuit of true knowledge. Rather, politics is about humans living with one another by finding a shared language to communicate with one another on matters that affect them all. Truth is in that sense contingent on what is being said as opposed to setting the standard for it. In other words, truth is the embodiment of shareability among us. While truth as such ensures the viability of a political entity, truth by no means represents a normative standard to adjudicate among contesting actors in what they say, let alone in what they do. During Thucydides’ times, ancient China was also experiencing a tumultuous time as the ruling Zhou dynasty deteriorated into the period of the Warring States (481–221 BCE). This was when the rulers of Zhou no longer presided over the territories brought under its control through conquest. Instead of professing allegiance to the Zhou royalty, the lords of these territories became kings themselves to rule over their own land. The period was one marked by endless military campaigns as each of the seven major states aimed to conquer the rest (Lewis 1999). Yet, the period was also known for its intellectual vibrancy as different thinkers challenged the restoring of order among these warring states – including offering ideas and advice to rulers on good governance. Among these thinkers was Confucius (551–479 BCE). His thought, which came to be known as Confucianism, went on to become the state ideology of China from the Han dynasty (206 BCE–222 CE) until the end of the Qing dynasty in 1911 when China became a republic. The founding text of Confucianism was the Analects, which is a collection of dialogues between Confucius and his students as recorded by them. One key concept Confucius advanced is the ‘rectification of names’. Though the term only appears in one exchange in the Analects, it is considered a major aspect of Confucius’ thought. Generations of Confucian scholars from past and present, including Western academics, have debated over its interpretation (Makeham 2003). The passage in question reads as follows: Zi Lu said: ‘The monarch of the state of Wei wants you to govern the country, what is the first thing you plan on doing?’ Confucius said: ‘First it is necessary to rectify the names.’Zi Lu said: ‘Is that really what has to be done? You are being too pedantic, aren’t you now? How will you rectify these names?’Confucius said: ‘Zhong You, you are too unrefined. A gentleman, faced with a matter that he does not understand, takes a skeptical attitude. If names are not correct, one cannot speak smoothly and reasonably, and if one cannot speak smoothly and reasonably, affairs cannot be managed successfully. If affairs cannot be managed successfully, rites and music will not be conducted. If rites and music are not conducted, punishments will not be suitable. And if punishments are not suitable, the common people will not know what to do. So, when the gentleman uses names, it is necessary to be able to speak so that people understand. If one can say it, one can definitely do it. A gentleman should not be careless with words’ (Analects 13:3 in Cao 2016, 148). This translation is offered by the contemporary philosopher Cao Feng. As Cao notes, the passage is what started the whole debate over ‘exactly what kind of names did Confucius... wish to rectify’ (Cao 2016, 148). Of the three major groups of interpretation examined by Cao, beginning with classical Confucian scholarship, one is arguably the most influential and certainly most pertinent to the issue of language and politics. This is the interpretation that was first associated with the Neo-Confucian master, Zhu Xi (1130–1200), who argued that the ‘rectification of names is simply the rectification of politics’ (Cao 2016, 149). Within this interpretive framework, rectification has the dual functions of correction and prescription by ensuring that predetermined hierarchical roles are strictly adhered to through following ‘the system of rites and propriety’ (Cao 2016, 151). In addition, the rectification of names entails ‘using names to rectify actuality’ (Cao 2016, 151). Yet Cao rejects this whole body of interpretive works by arguing that these were ideas developed later. Instead, Cao suggests the following: The original meaning of Confucius’ rectification of names may, then, be quite simple. Confucius did not mean to establish a concrete, normative system of “names”; rather, Confucius was simply the first person in history to realize or remark upon the importance of language in politics. As a politician, he noticed and foresaw the impact that the indeterminacy, ambiguity, and arbitrariness of names would have on politics. Confucius recognized the political consequences of language’s not accurately expressing meaning or not being accurately received by people. He realized the great role that names, as a means of distinguishing right and wrong and establishing norms, could play in society and politics (Cao 2016, 168). Scholarly debates aside, Cao’s view has the advantage of identifying an interpretation of this controversial exchange in the Analects that enables its readers to extrapolate from it the observation that the meaning of words depends as much on their users as on their interpreters; neither of which can be predetermined. Accordingly, a good ruler is someone who can speak without ambiguity to his subjects and make good his words through actions. Stated differently, Cao’s view on what concerned Confucius then, who was living through times of protracted political upheaval, is that language is an indispensable political tool for those in power and can be deployed by both good and bad rulers alike. To sum up, this historical survey shows that politics as a war of words is by no means a distinctive marker of contemporary politics nor the Western world. Be it ancient or current, east or west, language is subject to manipulation to serve political purposes and when there is an outright war of words that defies existing norms, it is indicative of a political situation in which people no longer share a language and truth becomes irrelevant. Accordingly, political order entails stability in language use. Truth and Politics As previously noted, current use of the term post-truth as an adjective to the term ‘politics’ suggests that once there was a time when politics aligned with truth. Indeed, if we start with Plato’s Republic as the key founding text of Western political thought, we see that the ideal polis (city-state of ancient Greece) is where truth and politics converge, and justice is achieved. Written around 380 BCE when Athens was still coping with its defeat by the Spartans in the Peloponnesian War, the Republic is a defence of the rule of the ‘philosopher king’, defined as someone who is ‘guided by the truth’ and is ‘always and in every way’ in pursuit of the truth (Plato 1974, 490a). For Plato, truth converges with virtues and hence, letting the philosopher take charge of politics is to let the wisest and the most virtuous lead the less wise and the less virtuous even if it requires compulsion (Plato 1974, 499b). In Plato’s words, ‘…until the philosophers attain power in a city there will be no respite from evil for either city or citizens…’ (Plato 1974, 501e). The uncompromising rule of philosopher-kings is made palatable by the claim that we are all ‘earth- born brothers’ with random mixtures of gold, silver, bronze and iron, but only the gold can rule (Plato 1974, 414–415). Understandably, academic debates over the interpretation of Plato’s Republic revolve around the question of whether truth as attained in philosophy can be realised in politics as action and whether such a connection is even desirable. Without getting into the details of these scholarly exchanges, I suggest that they all share the concern that truth acquired through the rigorous process of philosophical reasoning is not without problem when applied to the real world of living humans. This is because not all humans are philosophers – and indeed, in Plato’s view, not everyone is capable of becoming a philosopher given the protracted and arduous training that one needs to endure to become one. Hannah Arendt (1906–1975), a highly influential political philosopher of the twentieth century, notes that ‘Plato was the first to introduce the division between those who know and do not act and those who act and do not know’ and that such a separation has remained ‘at the root of all theories of domination’ (Arendt 1958, 223, 225). What Arendt points out in this remark is not the gap between theory and practice, but rather that Plato provides the normative ground for those who know the truth to tell those who do not know what to do. Arendt herself took on the challenge of understanding the relationship between truth and politics through her analysis of Nazism and Stalinism. Arendt’s insight, which was controversial when The Origins of Totalitarianism was published in 1951, was to identify Nazism and Stalinism as representative of a new form of political rule – totalitarianism – making it distinct from ‘other forms of political oppression... such as despotism, tyranny and dictatorship’ (Arendt 1973, 460). Arendt defines totalitarianism as a self- contained system of ideas driven by their ‘logic’ and marked by a mode of reasoning called ‘ideological thinking.’ Ideological thinking as such is a distinctive form of political reasoning defined by three characteristics. First, ideological thinking claims to provide a ‘total explanation’ of all historical happenings, encompassing the past, the present, and the future. Second, while ideological thinking is an attempt to account for ‘factual reality’ in its totality, this mode of thinking is paradoxically divorced from reality and experience. This is because experience, being rooted in specificity, is clearly limited in its claim to totality. It follows that as its third characteristic, ideological thinking aims to emancipate thought from the limitation imposed by experience through a ‘specific method of demonstration.’ The method involves arranging facts into an ‘absolutely logical procedure’ that starts from an ‘axiomatically accepted premise’. It is, in short, a ‘process of deduction from a premise’ – which is the only possible movement in the realm of logic that leads to one definitive conclusion. This is how the ‘logicality of ideological thinking’ provides the basis for total explanation and the ‘principle of action’ for totalitarian movement (Arendt 1973, 468–474). Stated differently, totalitarianism is a form of uncompromising idealism that exists in one’s head irrespective of shared reality as experienced. It is the perverse form of what Arendt later refers to as ‘rational truth’, which is the product of the ‘speculative mind’ that belongs to philosophy, mathematics and the sciences. The ‘speculative mind’ is the mind working on its way to generate axioms and theories by relying on the cognitive capacity of the human brain (Arendt 1977, 231). The presence of others has no bearing whatsoever on rational truth. In contrast, ‘factual truth’ is what happens when humans are ‘living and acting together’ (Arendt 1977, 231). Factual truth is therefore particular and temporal by definition. But more importantly, factual truth is ‘political by nature’ because it can only be validated in the context of the human community (Arendt 1977, 238). In other words, factual truth is about humans in their plurality rather than in their singularity. For factual truth to be sustainable, we need what Arendt calls ‘common sense’ – understood as ‘community sense’ (Arendt 1982, 72). There is also another distinction about truth that Arendt makes which is pertinent to understanding how totalitarianism works. The issue is whether the so-called totalitarian ideology is simply an unnecessarily cumbersome way of saying that it is an all-round and polished lie. Here, Arendt calls totalitarian ideology the ‘modern lie’ – in contrast to the ‘traditional lie’. The latter is restricted by two conditions: that it is a lie about the ‘particulars’ and that it deceives only the ‘enemy’ – which means that the liar is not engaged in self- deception. The modern lie, however, involves a ‘complete rearrangement of the whole factual texture’. It also intends to deceive everyone alike, to the extent that those who initiate the lie eventually ‘fall victims to their own falsehood’ (Arendt 1977, 249–254). This distinction between the traditional and modern lie is important. It indicates that not only is totalitarianism a lie, but the lie is in fact too big to fit into the standard meaning of the word. To tell a lie from truth, we need a common standard. In the case of a traditional lie, the common standard is precisely ‘the fabric of factuality’. As such, a lie always appears as a ‘tear’ to that fabric. Yet, modern lies require making a surrogate reality with a completely different context for facts to fit ‘without seam, crack, or fissure, exactly as the facts fitted into their original context’. Arendt notes that as long as those who concoct the surrogate reality are prepared to engage in self- deception to ‘create a semblance of truthfulness’, there is nothing to prevent ‘these new stories, images, and non-facts from becoming an adequate substitute for reality and factuality’ (Arendt 1977, 253–254). Totalitarianism therefore requires a person to stand outside of the system itself in order to make sense of it. Arendt points out that it is futile for us to argue with (for example) a Nazi or a Stalinist on race or class. To confront totalitarianism requires more than just a confrontation with specific facts. It is a more fundamental confrontation between reality as experienced and its total rejection. This means that Nazism and Stalinism are more than radical ways of conducting racial conflict or class struggle. Rather: Totalitarian politics – far from being simply antisemitic or racist or imperialist or communist – use and abuse their own ideological and political elements until the basis of factual reality, from which the ideologies originally derived their propaganda value– the value of struggle, for instance, or the interest conflicts between Jews and their neighbours – have all but disappeared (Arendt 1973, xv). Accordingly: The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and fiction (that is, the reality of experience) and the distinction between true and false (that is, the standards of thought) no longer exist (Arendt 1973, 474). Who then is the ‘ideal subject’ of totalitarianism? Although there is a revival of interest in Arendt’s observation on truth and politics since the onset of post- truth politics, not enough has been said about her reply to the question (Hyvönen 2018; Klinkler 2018; Lee 2019; Zerilli 2020). Yet if we take a look at Arendt’s portrait of this ideal subject, her view is even more pertinent to our current challenge. As a self-contained system of ideas that is detached from experience, totalitarian thinking offers consistency in ways that reality cannot. Arendt notes that this kind of consistency is especially appealing to those who have lost a sense of bearing in the world (Arendt 1973, 353). They constitute what she calls the ‘masses’. The ‘mass man’ is thus a highly isolated and atomised individual, who is ‘obsessed by a desire to escape from reality’ (Arendt 1973, 318, 352). In his ‘essential homelessness’ the mass man can ‘no longer bear its accidental, incomprehensible aspects’ (Arendt 1973, 352). This longing for escape from reality is a ‘verdict against the world’ in which one is ‘forced to live’ but ‘cannot exist’ (Arendt 1973, 352). Such a situation is ripe for the ‘revolt of the masses’ against ‘common sense,’ which is ‘the result of their atomisation, of their loss of social status’ and with it, the ‘whole sector of communal relationships in whose framework common sense makes sense’ (Arendt 1973, 352). In short, the masses are people who are considered to be ‘superfluous or can be spared … [who] cannot be integrated into any organisation based on common interest’ (Arendt 1973, 311). Whether one agrees with Arendt’s analysis of the social conditions in the interwar years that led to the formation of the ‘masses’, her portrait of the ‘mass man’ is a powerful account of what can happen to an individual who has become disposable to the society that they used to belong to. Hand in hand with this phenomenon is indeed the collapse of ‘common sense’ that leaves the dislodged individual scrambling for reconnection. By offering the masses a substitute reality validated by the ‘logic of an idea’ rather than by experience, totalitarianism makes it possible for them to live in a world where there is no condition of plurality. Between ‘facing the anarchic growth and total arbitrariness of decay’ and ‘bowing down before the most rigid, fantastically fictitious consistency of an ideology’, the masses will likely ‘choose the latter’ (Arendt 1973, 352). A world created by ideology, then, is more attractive to the masses not because ‘they are stupid and wicked, but because in the general disaster this escape grants them a minimum of self- respect’ by conjuring up ‘a lying world of consistency which is more adequate to the needs of the human mind than reality itself’ (Arendt 1973, 353). Moreover, it is precisely this ability to guarantee consistency that makes it possible for the leaders of totalitarian movements to demand ‘total, unrestricted, unconditional and unalterable loyalty of the individual member’ (Arendt 1973, 323). While this chapter is not a study of the social factors that led to specific contemporary developments such as the result of the Brexit referendum or the election of Donald Trump in 2016, Arendt’s ‘mass man’ seem to have found their counterparts among the supporters of Brexit and Trumpism. Studies of voters’ profiles in both events point to a disproportionate share of supporters from white male lower income backgrounds without university educations. These are individuals who have either already lost their jobs to globalisation or who are at high risk of losing their job with very little capacity to be retrained for the twenty-first century market economy of advanced industrialised states (BBC 2016; Pew Research Center 2018). In short, these displaced workers are part of the tapestry forming the modern equivalent of Arendt’s ‘mass man’ – ready to be the recruits of totalitarianism. Conclusion If we step back to take a more comprehensive approach to the relationship between truth and politics, both historically and theoretically, it is not so obvious that 2016 is a defining moment. From ancient China and ancient Greece to our so-called post-truth age, the indeterminacy of language appears to be a persistent political challenge. Language is always open to manipulation by its users to serve power. Nonetheless, the tendency these days is to single out the ubiquity of social media and the proliferation of Internet platforms as the incubator for the countless cyberwars of words that in turn fuel the real world of politics. In this context, language is no longer the conveyor of objective facts and accurate information, but rather the medium for expressing subjective opinions and feelings, as captured by the Oxford Dictionary’s definition of the term ‘post-truth politics’. In contrast, the historical approach used in this chapter shows that it is in fact too easy to point the figure at the Internet and digital communication for the political challenge that we face today. What is being suggested here is that with or without the Internet, language, be it used to convey facts or emotions, is simply a tool for communication that humans have invented. While language per se cannot adjudicate what is true or not true, what is right or wrong, it embodies such capacity when language is a shared norm. That shared norm cannot be sustained without some semblance of cohesion in any given community. Any war of words, irrespective of its platform, is indicative of the breakdown of such cohesiveness. Returning to the original context in which the term post-truth politics was first used by Steve Tesich helps to identify the important distinction between truth as the standard for knowledge and truth as the standard for action. The two do not necessarily coincide. Placed in the context of the history of political thought, this distinction is in fact at the heart of Plato’s Republic. Yet when the philosopher as the quintessential bearer of truth becomes king, the polis that he rules over is far from the ideal of a just state that it purports to be. Instead, it is one that is held together by lies and coercion. What Arendt reveals through her study of Nazism and Stalinism is that it is dangerous for the kind of truth that philosophy generates – ‘rational truth’ – to become the guide to politics. Politics guided by rational truth can only be uncompromising and follows a logic of its own that cannot afford the ambiguity and indeterminacy of reality as lived experiences of humans. A world of post-truth politics can be an opportunity for a new kind of politics if it is indeed about dismantling the idea that truth is the ideal that politics should strive for. But as it stands, the post-truth politics of today is more about invoking a past that never exists to judge the presence as a crisis in naming when the real crisis is about rebuilding a shared space that has room for all – be they of the left, right or centre; cosmopolitan or parochial; civic-minded or self-centred; liberal-minded or bigoted. Politics is and always will be about striving for that space, without which no human can thrive. References Arendt, Hannah. 1958. The Human Condition. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Arendt, Hannah. 1973. The Origins of Totalitarianism. Rev. ed. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Arendt, Hannah. 1977. “Truth and Politics.” In Between Past and Future, 227–264. New York: Penguin Books. Arendt, Hannah. 1982. Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, edited by Ronald Beiner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. British Broadcasting Corporation. 2016. “Brexit vote: The breakdown.” BBC News, December 7, 2016. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-38227674 Cao, Feng. 2016. “A New Examination of Confucius’ Rectification of Names.” Journal of Chinese Humanities 2: 147–171. https://doi-org.subzero.lib. uoguelph.ca/ doi/ 10.1163/23521341-12340032. Connor, W. Robert. 1984. Thucydides. Princeton: Princeton University Press. de Jonge, Casper C. 2017. “Dionysius of Halicarnassus on Thucydides.” in The Oxford Handbook of Thucydides, edited by Sara Forsdyke, Edith Foster, and Ryan Balot. Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/ oxfordhb/9780199340385.013.17 https://www-oxfordhandbooks-com.subzero. lib.uoguelph.ca/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199340385.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199340385 Hyvönen, Ari-Elmeri. 2018. “Careless Speech: Conceptualizing Post-Truth Politics.” New Perspectives 26 (3): 31–55. https://www.proquest.com/ scholarly-journals/careless-speech-conceptualizing-post-truth/ docview/2204515132/se-2?accountid=11233. Hobbes, Thomas. 1839–1845. The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, edited by Sir William Molesworth. London: John Bohn. Vol. 8. Klinkner, Melanie. 2018. “Reasonable Truth.” International Journal of Media & Cultural Politics 14 (3): 393–99. doi:10.1386/macp.14.3.393_7. Lee, Haiyan. 2019. “When Nothing Is True, Everything Is Possible: On Truth and Power by Way of Socialist Realism.” PMLA/Publications of the Modern Language Association of America 134 (5). Cambridge University Press: 1157–64. https://doi.org/10.1632/pmla.2019.134.5.1157 Lewis, Mark E. 1999. “Warring States Political History.” In The Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Origins of Civilization to 221 BC, edited by Michael Loewe and Edward Shaughnessy, 587–650. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Makeham, John. 2003. “Zheng ming (Rectification of names).” In RoutledgeCurzon Encyclopedia of Confucianism, edited by Xinzhong Yao. Vol. 2: 813-814. New York: Routledge. Oxford Languages, n. d. “Word of the Year 2016.” Accessed 19 August 2017. https://languages.oup.com/word-of-the-year/2016/ Peters, Richard. 1979. Hobbes. Westport: Greenwood Press. Pew Research Center. 2018. “An examination of the 2016 electorate, based on validated voters.” Report, August 9, 2018. https://www.pewresearch.org/ politics/2018/08/09/an-examination-of-the-2016-electorate-based-on- validated-voters/ Plato. 1974. Republic. Translated by G. M. A. Grube. Indianapolis: Hackett. Tesich, Steve. 1992. “Watergate Syndrome: A Government of Lies.” The Nation: 12-14. January 6/13, 1992. Thucydides. 1972. The Peloponnesian War. Translated by Rex Warner. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books. Wolin, Sheldon. 2004. Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Westen Political Thought. Expanded Edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Zerilli, Linda M. G. 2020. ‘Fact-Checking and Truth-Telling in an Age of Alternative Facts.’ Le foucaldien 6, no. 1: 2, 1–22. Theresa Man Ling Lee is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Guelph (Canada). Lee is a political theorist who specializes in contemporary political thought. Her research and teaching areas include continental philosophy, Marxism and critical theory, feminism, postmodernism, philosophy of social science, psychoanalysis, multiculturalism, human rights, disability studies, modern Chinese political thought and comparative political theory. Lee has published on a wide range of subjects in these areas, including intercultural pedagogy and the challenges of teaching as a person with multiple minority designations in a Canadian university classroom.
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