SCROLL NEWS / DISCOVERY

Search headlines

Find the stories shaping the conversation.

Search mode
Refine results
Active filters Keyword All time

Results for " gjia " 13 found 🔀 AI-powered Shuffle

When papers become currency: a Chinese debate about trust in science

Last Saturday, 31 October, I went to the University of Hong Kong’s Beijing Centre for its Talent Forum. It was the fourth stop in the series this year, following events in Shanghai’s Zhangjiang, Shenzhen’s Qianhai, and on HKU’s main campus. The programme covered a remarkable distance in one afternoon. HKU’s Xiao-Jing Wang discussed computational neuroscience, intelligence, and the prefrontal cortex—before even delivering his inaugural public lecture to students back in Hong Kong. His colleague Bing Zhang took us from the Big Bang to artificial intelligence. Tsinghua’s Xue Lan asked how AI might reshape the institutional infrastructure underpinning higher education. There were lively panels featuring industry leaders from JD.com, Xiaomi, Haier—and Kaiser Y Kuo on the closing panel discussing innovation and international connections. I cannot pretend to have followed every detail of the brain models or the astrophysics. The talk that stayed with me was closer to something we have covered before: Zhou Zhonghe 周忠和 on papers, evaluation, and scientific trust. Zhou is a palaeontologist, an Academician of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and an international member of the US National Academy of Sciences. He is also editor-in-chief of The Intellectual (知识分子), China’s leading science commentary platform. His subject was uncomfortable enough for a room full of successful academics: what happens when the system for recognising good science starts rewarding something else? Part of my interest came from our sister newsletter, The East is Read, which covered the controversy around “Geng Tongxue” in May. A PhD dropout from Beihang University, Geng has publicly challenged papers by prominent researchers through detailed online allegations of manipulated images and fabricated data. At Tongji University, an investigation into a challenged Nature paper found academic misconduct, and the dean of its life sciences school was removed. The affair brought doubts about academic integrity well beyond laboratories and university committees. How could someone outside the established hierarchy spot problems in papers that had passed through prestigious journals and institutions? And what, exactly, had all that prestige guaranteed? Zhou approached these questions through two essays published in July by The Intellectual: one by Wang Xiaodong, director of the National Institute of Biological Sciences, Beijing, and a response by Wang Liming, of Shanghai’s Shangsi Institute of Natural Sciences. Both began with the controversy over Geng. Their arguments deserve a wider audience, so I want to put parts of them alongside what Zhou said on Saturday. Wang Xiaodong’s starting point is evolution. A research system selects for the behaviour it rewards. Grants, jobs, journals, talent programmes, and prizes collectively determine which scientists prosper and which practices get passed down from advisors to students. “Whatever the system rewards is what it will evolve to produce,” he writes, citing the ancient Chinese saying: The King of Chu loved slender waists, and many in the palace starved to death. That is a more demanding diagnosis than saying there are dishonest people in science. Punishing a fraudster does not change the selective environment that made a particular kind of research profitable. His account also gives scientific success an awkward role in the story. As Zhou put it on Saturday, science became a victim of its own success. Once research became central to industry, national power, and economic growth, universities and laboratories expanded, and public money followed. That created an administrative need for rapid decisions: who should get the next grant, the next laboratory, the next appointment? The difficulty is that the true value of a discovery may take years or decades of testing and building to become clear. Resource allocation cannot wait that long. Publication counts, journal prestige, impact factors, and citations therefore become convenient ways to make an instant judgement. “The real problem is not that these indicators have no value,” Wang Xiaodong writes, “but that they are trying to answer a question that only time can answer.” Telling administrators simply to stop counting papers will never be enough. They still have budgets to distribute and appointments to make. Something has to replace the shortcut. Zhou described the consequences inside publishing. Papers acquire ever more requirements: a complete story, polished presentation, extensive datasets, and accessibility to readers beyond the immediate field. Individually, those demands sound reasonable. Together, he warned, they produce formulaic “eight-legged” papers 八股文 and rigid reviewing, while genuinely original or non-consensus work struggles to get past journal editors—some of whom wield immense gatekeeping power despite having limited laboratory experience themselves. Meanwhile, the demands for sprawling, “complete” narratives have fuelled a wider replication crisis. Wang Xiaodong uses a mahjong metaphor to describe the result: put the complex papers published by the exact same lab over several years side by side, and they often look like “Thirteen Orphans” (十三不靠)—every tile completely unrelated to the next, and none of them reproducible by outsiders. Zhou also spoke frankly as an editor who has trouble finding reviewers. Everyone wants someone else to review their work; qualified senior researchers have little time to return the favour. The labour is anonymous, unpaid, and brings almost no institutional recognition, so it increasingly gets passed down to postdocs and graduate students. And while anonymity protects reviewers from rank and personal favours, hyper-specialisation means an author’s most qualified reviewer is often a direct competitor, shielded from accountability. The protection and the problem coexist. Wang Liming takes the argument a step further. The decisive change, in his essay, is the instant conversion of academic honour into material resources. Once a paper can be cashed in for funding, a job, students, commercial investment, or even a company valuation, scientists are alienated from their work: they must keep minting this “research currency” to keep their teams alive. He is careful not to romanticise the past. The old world of gentleman scientists—financially independent figures like Boyle and Darwin who needed nothing from external funders—was also a closed club that excluded people without inherited wealth, women, and much of humanity outside the West. Professional science allowed ordinary people, himself included, to become researchers. Nobody should want to undo that. The problem, in his account, is an exchange system that becomes too uniform and too difficult to correct. His most pointed Chinese example is the “hat” (帽子): the prestigious talent designation that brings continuing access to money, laboratory space, students, and institutional influence. “If papers are the circulating currency of the research system, then a ‘hat’ is a bond that pays interest over the long term,” he writes. A paper at least requires another round of peer review. A title in the Chinese context can lock in a judgement made years ago and turn it into permanent status rent, regardless of whether its holder is still doing good science. Here, official institutions hire, organise, and evaluate scientists. Unlike honours awarded by autonomous academic communities in the West, a Chinese “hat” blends non-scientist administrative power with state authority. Once granted, it turns a past judgement into permanent status rent that is nearly impossible to revoke—because taking a hat off would imply that official authority erred in putting it on. Both Wangs see China as experiencing, at compressed speed, pressures present across global science. Research expansion, rising investment, publication growth, and elaborate evaluation metrics arrived in China within two or three decades rather than two or three centuries. Zhou agreed with that international framing—noting that recent US White House science policy documents and the new president of the US National Academy of Sciences, a fellow palaeontologist who recently visited Zhou’s institute in Beijing, have raised strikingly similar warnings about consensus-bound peer review, short-term project grants, and the replication crisis. Still, Zhou emphasised that China’s traditional hierarchy, personal networks (guanxi), and the ethos that “a good scholar becomes an official” (学而优则仕) amplify those pressures at home. So what would change things? Here Zhou’s tone differed from the call for a revolution in scientific trust in Wang Xiaodong’s essay. As an evolutionary biologist, Zhou favoured patchwork repair (修修补补). Living systems survive through accumulated adjustments; dramatic mutations are usually fatal. Science cannot return to a small, slow-moving pastoral era, especially after the successive accelerations of professionalisation after the Second World War, the internet, and now artificial intelligence. But it can alter the local environment in which researchers work. He pointed to domestic experiments designed to support unconventional research and diversify funding, including Tencent’s New Cornerstone Investigator Program, the Xplorer Prize, and the Future Science Prize. He also mentioned participating in reviews for “major non-consensus projects” under the National Natural Science Foundation of China. One guiding principle he recalled was wonderfully direct: “Failure is allowed; corruption is not” (允许失败,不允许腐败). That distinction would mean quite a lot if taken seriously. An honest attempt that fails should not have to disguise itself as a success to survive an assessment. Wang Liming’s essay adds a sharp caveat to the optimism about new domestic funders. Multiple organisations do not automatically produce multiple ways of judging science. If the same pool of senior domestic scientists makes the decisions through the same two-round review procedures, it is still “fake diversity.” He argues for three distinct kinds of money: broad baseline funding governed by fair procedures; patient funding for questions that take ten years; and non-consensus funding based on individual taste, deliberately empowering a few genuine experts to make biased, contrarian bets on eccentric ideas that would inevitably be averaged out by a committee. Replacing one monopoly with another achieves little; a healthy ecosystem needs variance. Zhou’s proposals for publishing were similarly concrete: strip papers of their resource-allocation burden and return them to recording discoveries and establishing priority; separate dissemination from evaluation, as eLife and Peer Community In do; adopt more modular “micro-publications” and real-name endorsements; recognize the labour of editors and reviewers; and give replication work proper credit rather than treating it as an unpublishable dead end. AI makes every part of this debate more urgent—and Zhou wove it throughout his talk. In his own preparation, he used AI to survey the declining influence of academic monographs, noting how tools are already changing how scholars gather information. More fundamentally, he placed AI as the latest great acceleration in scientific history: just as the internet sped up the pace of research and tightened external resource pressures, AI is compressing the cycle again. In the essays Zhou cited, AI cuts both ways. Wang Xiaodong expects large language models to erase much of the English-writing disadvantage long faced by Chinese scientists, further swelling the flood of papers coming out of Chinese labs. Wang Liming sees AI accelerating both ends of the trust crisis: it lowers the cost of paper mills and fabricated images just as quickly as it lowers the cost of automated image forensics, data auditing, and code reproduction. “Whoever builds the verification layer wins,” Wang Liming writes. His proposed alternative to the static, packaged “story paper” is a continuously versioned “unit of discovery” containing a falsifiable claim, raw data, analysis code, experimental parameters, and an ongoing log of independent checks—where negative results and failed replications are recorded rather than buried. Zhou ended his keynote by bringing AI back to the question of scientific honour and credit. Citing a recent Intellectual discussion on “What AI Means for Mathematics” featuring Fields Medalist Deng Yu 邓煜—at a moment when AI is already batch-solving mathematical conjectures, as HKU Vice-President Lin Chen noted in his opening remarks—Zhou agreed that human researchers must remain the principal agents: AI is a tool that frees scientists from tedious calculation to think about deeper, messier real-world problems. Yet that partnership creates a thorny new evaluation problem. When a breakthrough is made with AI, what is the human contribution and what is the machine’s? And since AI models distil centuries of accumulated human scholarship, is it right that the credit and value flow so heavily to the private AI companies building the tools? The old struggle over how to assign scientific honour is acquiring a whole new layer. What I took away was a serious discussion of how science can remain trustworthy as its scale, incentives, and tools change. These were scientists with real standing inside China’s system questioning how that standing is produced, and proposing changes that would affect their own institutions and peers. That made the afternoon at HKU’s Beijing Centre worthwhile. At the close, Wang Feng, Director of Communications and Public Affairs at HKU, said the value of the forum series—which heads to Hangzhou in December and cities like Chengdu early next year—would lie in the real cooperation it helped bring about. The university has plenty to celebrate: this week it topped the QS Asia rankings for a second consecutive year, alongside its 11th-place position in the QS World University Rankings 2027. For me, bringing this debate to an audience beyond the people who review papers and allocate grants was a useful contribution. Share [ The East is Read PhD dropout’s exposé forces an academic fraud reckoning in China A former doctoral student turned blogger has shaken China’s academic establishment by publicly accusing prominent university scholars of fabricating data and manipulating papers, triggering investigations at several leading institutions and drawing rare attention from state media… Read more 5 months ago · 43 likes · 8 comments · Yuxuan JIA ](https://www.eastisread.com/p/phd-dropouts-expose-forces-an-academic?utm_source=substack&utm_campaign=post_embed&utm_medium=web&embedding_publication_id=47580)

pekingnology.com logo
Nov 5 • 4:21 AM EST • Science • pekingnology.com
Deep dive
😐 Neutral (7%)
ahah
57%
wow
43%
Shanghai Science and Technology Investment Tower Mixed-Use Development / NBBJ

Completed in 2024 in Shanghai, China. Images by SFAP. Located in the core business district of Zhangjiang Science City, the Shanghai Science and Technology Investment Tower project features office,...

archdaily.com logo
Oct 13 • 8:00 PM EDT • Science • archdaily.com
The EU’s Externalized Borders: Third Countries and the Politics of Responsibility - Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

The European Union (EU) has long sought to control migration before people reach European territory by externalizing border control, defined as “the totality of co-bordering activities initiated by the EU for securing its external borders from irregular immigrants.” Through practices such as readmission cooperation, safe-third-country rules, return arrangements, and security partnerships with non-EU states, it […]

gjia.georgetown.edu logo
Oct 13 • 11:00 AM EDT • Politics • gjia.georgetown.edu
Science popularization center in Heilongjiang offers interactive experience of Siberian tigers, Amur leopards

People visit the Northeast China Tiger and Leopard National Park Dongning Science Popularization an

en.people.cn logo
Oct 12 • 10:57 PM EDT • Science • en.people.cn
Science popularization center in Heilongjiang offers interactive experience of Siberian tigers, Amur leopards

Science popularization center in Heilongjiang offers interactive experience of Siberian tigers, Amur leopards-

english.news.cn logo
Oct 12 • 8:52 AM EDT • Science • english.news.cn
War, Erasure, and the Politics of Culture in Sudan - Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Two millennia of inhabitation by indigenous groups, immigrant and diaspora communities, and many others who made the land their home have shaped Sudan’s cultural legacy along the two Niles. Today, over 120 languages connect Sudan’s territories and diasporas, exemplifying the country’s immense diversity as the result of its complex history. However, contemporary legislation, such as […]

gjia.georgetown.edu logo
Aug 7 • 11:00 AM EDT • Politics • gjia.georgetown.edu
Tyler Herro comments on Las Vegas altercation with Bam Adebayo
sports.yahoo.com logo
Jul 14 • 12:02 PM EDT • Sports • sports.yahoo.com
One Health in a Fractured World: Why Global Health Governance Must Adapt to Geopolitical Fragmentation - Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Introduction In early 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic revealed the weaknesses of global health systems to infectious diseases. However, less recognized was how the emergence of this novel virus highlighted the global changes converging to heighten outbreak risks: increased human-animal contact and agricultural intensification, accelerated population growth and urbanization, and changing weather and climatic patterns. These […]

gjia.georgetown.edu logo
Jun 5 • 11:33 AM EDT • Health • gjia.georgetown.edu
Deep dive
😐 Neutral (7%)
ahah
55%
wow
45%
US terrorist label for Brazil gangs risks higher business costs

The U.S. designation of Brazil's biggest criminal groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) starting Friday is likely to increase the risks and costs of doing business in ​a country where gangs have had years to penetrate the formal economy.

reuters.com logo
Jun 5 • 6:02 AM EDT • Business • reuters.com
Rare earth breakthrough in China’s icy northeast

A new type of deposit in Heilongjiang and Jilin promises easier, cheaper mining than in southern clay-rich areas, say scientists.

scmp.com logo
May 18 • 1:00 AM EDT • Science • scmp.com
Worms swam Earth’s oceans 525 million years ago, much earlier than scientists believed

New fossil discovery reveals 535 million-year-old worms, annelids, that were already crawling and swimming, reshaping early animal evolution.

earth.com logo
Apr 23 • 8:00 PM EDT • Science • earth.com
Investment and Statecraft: The International Politics of Sovereign Wealth Funds - Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

In 1953, Kuwait established the world’s first sovereign wealth fund to invest the country’s oil revenues and generate returns that would reduce its reliance on a single resource. Since then, over 100 separate funds have been created to preserve national wealth and ensure long-term fiscal sustainability. Today, they manage over $10 trillion in global assets. In this discussion with GJIA, political economist Kathryn Lavelle explains the increasingly novel dynamics that surround fund behavior and what the world can come to expect from their growing presence in international financial markets. GJIA: When it comes to the roles sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) play in global markets and politics, what would you say makes them unique? Kathryn Lavelle: Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) operate on behalf of governments as investors. That in itself is a strange relationship. Within them, a core contest takes place between the state’s interests (or sovereign) part of the dynamic, and the money interests (or wealth) part of it, and these two aspects are frequently in contradiction, serving fundamentally different goals. SWFs are also quite fascinating because when you talk to the people who manage these funds, they have an interest in convincing you that the decisions are made almost exclusively on a financial basis—they really will go to great lengths to differentiate their government owners and those who make the management decisions. At the same time, these people ultimately answer to someone in power. Therefore, for most SWFs, it remains deeply unclear who is actually making the investment decisions and for what purposes. Of course, it is not always clear how other vehicles, such as hedge funds and private equity make the decisions they do, but I think what a lot of people find particularly disconcerting about SWFs is that they seem to act on behalf of people who have a different identity from their own. People who could be trying to manipulate politics and markets in a way that would have a long-term effect on their own populations. Regular investors come and go at will, and they only share an interest in profit as far as most of us understand. However, SWFs have that extra “sovereign” part right behind them that obscures their true interest. GJIA: These funds can be found in countries all across the globe, in both authoritarian states and democracies. Would you say SWFs differ in their goals and structures between regime-type? KL: It is not necessarily regime type that makes the goals and structures of SWFs different. It has to do with their economies. Let’s look at a country like China. There’s going to be a debate about exactly how to characterize the regime, but it is a country with many different kinds of sovereign wealth funds, and a particularly opaque state connection to each. At one time, some of the state-owned Chinese oil companies created specialized investment vehicles listed outside Chinese markets that excluded parts of the firms that were more associated with human rights violations. At the same time, the China Investment Corporation (CIC)­—China’s largest SWF—draws a lot of concern, not necessarily because of its investment activities, but because of the dynamics of global politics. So, I wouldn’t really tie differences to regime types themselves in a wholesale way, but rather to how such funds are perceived and how they are structured. Saudi Arabia’s SWF is getting all kinds of attention for its involvement in Hollywood, and this takes me right back to when I was a student in the 1980s, when people were concerned about Japanese investment entities buying assets in Hollywood. They aren’t quite the same in financial terms, but it’s the same kind of concern about foreign investment that drives people to be suspicious, and the whole idea that “foreigners are influencing Hollywood.” This holds true across industries, and it reflects where politics are in places like the United States right now. One metric we can try to look at is transparency, where all the funds will tell you, “we are transparent.” The problem you’ll keep running into with this approach is how you value things. When trying to do comparative studies of equity markets, you’ll find that every country doesn’t use Generally Accepted Accounting Principles like we do in the United States. A fund may appear opaque politically and not want people to show what they’re invested in or what their intent with that investment is, but they could also just not be able to report it because of the way it was purchased, or the kinds of shares they purchased. There are some assets out there that really are difficult to put a monetary value on. GJIA: To what extent do domestic politics shape SWF behavior in both the investing “home” country and the recipient “host” country? KL: This depends on the type of fund present and also on the extent to which voters’ political views are able to influence the fund. For example, in a democratic home state like Norway, the SWF doesn’t invest in nuclear weapons or tobacco because of social concerns, but there is a continuing debate over whether it should invest in oil, even though that’s where most of the money comes from. The degree to which Norway will continue to make those investments, and whether they contradict the government’s overall climate goals, is an open question in Norwegian politics. Because of the way the fund’s governance is structured, it may not be easy to resolve. On the other hand, some people consider pension funds, like the State Teachers Retirement System (STRS) in Ohio, to be quasi-SWF. They have a very strict separation between the people who make up the management division and the fund owners. No teacher or professor would want to invest in things that may harm the future of their students. At the same time, a fund manager might see an opportunity in a diversified multinational corporation that offers a good return, despite it deriving part of its revenue from e-cigarettes. These contests are very apparent. Domestic politics can work in host countries too. A good example is Singapore’s SWF, Temasek, investing in Thailand’s telecommunications sector. If you study political economy, you already know that countries everywhere are uncomfortable with foreign ownership of their telecom sectors because a foreign entity could monitor or manipulate our communications with each other. In the case of Temasek, there was significant pushback from Thai citizens surrounding the deal, which went on to influence national political sentiment toward Singapore as a whole, underscoring the risks some SWFs may face with their investment choices. In this case, fund behavior led to the dissolution of the entire Thai government in 2006 and a subsequent coup d’état. GJIA: To address some of this unease, the Santiago Principles were established in 2009 to ostensibly promote trust and transparency. From your perspective, have these mechanisms actually changed fund behavior? KL: In international relations theory, we always like to have a clear set of norms and best practices­—the orientation we want the proverbial ship to be going in. In that regard, the Santiago Principles at least got the discussion going about which direction SWFs should take at a time when people were very skittish about the growing size of these funds. Nobody wanted them to be out there and potentially destabilizing economies, so talks about disclosure, conditions for withdrawal, and the independence of managers were helpful when initiated. The biggest stumbling block was that there wasn’t exactly a good way to measure compliance with the Principles, let alone how to hold funds to them. If you read the Principles, they’re overall quite vague. In general, a fund doesn’t want to reveal how and why they make certain investment decisions because that information is proprietary—a fund makes money off of how and why it makes decisions—so how do you reconcile that with loosely-defined ideas of openness? Some decisions might have a political purpose. The bottom line is that trying to figure out and assign a score to compliance is not easy, and it is therefore the reason why the Santiago Principles never really got off the ground to the point where they could truly direct fund behavior. GJIA: Many emerging markets are looking to build their own SWFs from mineral and oil revenues. Historically, have funds shaped development trajectories in these countries? KL: I think the big story in international emerging markets investment is that the investment is increasingly no longer unidirectional. In the past multinational corporations of primarily Western background were the main form of foreign direct investment in a country. That has changed dramatically, to the point where you have companies from so-called “developing countries” taking over companies in the United States. Therefore, the landscape of international investment has changed, and I think SWFs are certainly a possibility to be the next step in the game. Historically, you didn’t need an entire financial vehicle to reinvest commodity revenues in your country, but as emerging markets get more financially sophisticated, their capacity to operate such funds has increased. SWFs would allow treasuries to move from relying on holding foreign exchange assets like cash or government bonds to having broader financial markets and targeted growth areas, while easing pressure on welfare expenditures. GJIA: With their increasing financial weight, do you see the presence of SWFs being a factor in the political choices leaders will have to make with regard to domestic and foreign policy? KL: It will depend on just how big the funds get. One of the reasons people are already apprehensive is because of their scale, and if certain SWFs in certain countries achieve a large-enough size, the presence will absolutely be cause for concern. The other factor political leaders will have to consider are their objectives. It’s not always clear how to define a SWF, or even where its activity is concentrated, but it is certainly a worry from the perspective of national security of opaque external investment. More than that, I think one of the most interesting questions going forward is whether the United States, the home to the world’s largest financial markets, will develop its own fund, for which the Trump administration announced a plan. There have also been several proposals in Congress. Were it to come into being, it would have tremendous weight. At the same time, one of the hallmarks of U.S. capitalism is a lack of government ownership of shares, so it would not be clear how such a fund would be received in domestic politics, or which direction it would take. Given how politically fragmented the country is, a Democratic administration would likely be concerned about different sectors of the economy, such as healthcare, and want investment there, rather than a Republican administration, which might prefer defense industries. No investment vehicle could thrive under conditions of such instability. Moreover, it remains unclear where the money to fund a theoretical U.S. SWF would come from. It would be a fundamentally different entity depending on whether it is financed with debt, economic surplus, commodities, or the sale of state companies, as in the case of Singapore. If it is debt, or government borrowing of some form, then the fund would have to outperform whatever the cost of that debt is, which is not an easy thing to do. I think our political leaders have enough on their plate. Our system has worked well keeping political and investment functions generally separate. We have seen different forms of business rise and fall, and even the perception of different countries, all of which funds are tied to. Unless a major SWF either starts—like in the case of the United States—or collapses—an issue that concerns the Saudis, I don’t see any political tsunamis on the horizon. . . . Kathryn Lavelle is the Ellen and Dixon Long Professor of World Affairs at Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio. Her research explores the exchange between domestic and international and political institutions with a particular emphasis on political economy and multilateralism. Dr. Lavelle’s first book, The Politics of Equity Finance in Emerging Markets, explored the political circumstances that surround large issues of stock in the developing world. After being granted tenure at Case Western, she was awarded an American Political Science Association Congressional Fellowship and named the William A. Steiger fellow, a designation given to the most promising political scientist in her class of fellows. While in Washington during 2006-2007, she worked on the staff of the House Committee on Financial Services on issues related to domestic and international monetary policy. Dr. Lavelle holds a PhD in political science from Northwestern University; an M.A. in government and foreign affairs from the University of Virginia; and a bachelor’s degree in international economics from Georgetown University. She is a permanent member of the New York Council on Foreign Relations. This transcript has been lightly edited for clarity and length. Interview conducted by Sid Mehrotra. Image Credit: Jason Leung, Unsplash Content Licenses, via Unsplash

gjia.georgetown.edu logo
Jan 28 • 6:00 AM EST • Politics • gjia.georgetown.edu
Deep dive
😐 Neutral (10%)
ahah
38%
wow
32%
love
30%
The New WHO Pandemic Treaty and Global Health Governance: Incorporating Common but Differentiated Responsibilities into PABS  - Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

On May 20, 2025, the World Health Assembly unanimously adopted the World Health Organization (WHO) Pandemic Agreement, an international treaty designed to strengthen pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response. The product of three years of arduous negotiations, the treaty marks a new era of global cooperation in public health. However, core aspects of the agreement remain unresolved—notably the Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing (PABS) System, which is intended to ensure equitable access to pandemic-related materials and benefits. To support the successful implementation of the WHO Pandemic Agreement, the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” should be formally incorporated into the negotiating agenda of the PABS annex. Introduction For the first time, an international treaty has enshrined the principle of “One Health,” the compelling idea that the health of animals, humans, and the environment all contribute to pandemic risks. SARS (2003), H1N1 (2009–10), Ebola (2014–16), and COVID-19 all emerged through zoonotic spillover from animal hosts—respectively, civets, hogs, and bats. Together, they underscore the need for a coordinated, cross-sectoral approach. The Pandemic Agreement responds to this call, requiring state parties to acknowledge the ecological interplay and commit to a comprehensive “One Health” strategy. Specifically, Article 5 charges governments to address “the drivers of pandemics and the emergence and re-emergence of infectious disease at the human-animal-environment interface,” including wild animal markets, deforestation, and antibiotic overuse. Yet the effectiveness of this “One Health” vision depends equally on the free flow of scientific information and data among countries and institutions. Just as environmental and animal health factors have been neglected in past global frameworks, so too has data sharing been marginalized, despite its centrality to timely detection and response. The Pandemic Agreement takes an important step by requiring governments to enhance data collection and cooperate with the World Health Organization (WHO). However, these provisions will remain aspirational without a robust Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing (PABS) annex. The PABS system will determine whether countries and researchers can rapidly exchange pathogen samples and genetic data while ensuring equitable access to resulting research and development, including diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines. Without such mechanisms, the treaty’s promise to operationalize “One Health” and strengthen global preparedness will risk becoming largely symbolic, echoing earlier failures to translate shared principles into coordinated action. Equity Concerns When the 2025 Health Assembly adopted the Pandemic Agreement, it left the difficult question of access to pathogens and the sharing of resulting benefits to be addressed in a separate agreement. Negotiations on this separate agreement, PABS, are now underway in Geneva. Yet governments remain divided over fundamental questions of equity between the countries that primarily contribute to the system and those that primarily draw from it—and consequently benefit. For example, wildlife in countries bordering the equator is likely to produce PABS materials, but companies in Europe are likely to use them to develop lucrative products. The most likely contributor countries are likely to be those biodiverse countries around the equator, such as Brazil, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Indonesia, where the number of human-mammalian viral host interactions is large. Conversely, countries most likely to benefit from this material are those with the technology, investors, and infrastructure to capitalize on genomic data, such as the United States, EU member states, and Japan. This imbalance reflects a broader pattern seen in prior international frameworks. Now, as in the past, the wealthiest countries in the world (a useful heuristic is membership of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)) disproportionately benefit from systems in which pathogens and genomic sequencing data are contributed to a common source. Under the International Agreement on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (the “Plant Treaty” or “Seed Treaty”) and the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework, companies from Europe and North America disproportionately withdraw biological samples and data for development into lucrative medical products. Their governments and companies have both statutory and contractual claims to the products that those companies correspondingly produce. PABS appears poised to follow the same pattern. The text calls for strong language on access to pathogens and associated data, but the corresponding benefits that should flow to poorer countries are couched in equivocal or non-binding language. Common but Differentiated Responsibilities To address these inequities, the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” should be formally incorporated into the negotiating agenda of the PABS annex. Common but differentiated responsibilities are often a feature of climate change negotiations. The basic principle is that, even though all countries should reduce carbon emissions, governments that became rich and powerful through massive carbon emissions (e.g., France, the United Kingdom, the United States) should have a greater obligation to address the resulting crises. Applied to PABS, it would require that governments hosting and supporting companies developing lucrative products carry greater obligations toward the cost of running the PABS system; share benefits or final medical products; and transfer technology to help countries worldwide develop their own capacities to innovate and manufacture vaccines during an emergency. For example, an annex could mandate that any company based in an OECD country that withdraws PABS material would be obligated to donate the resulting diagnostics, therapeutics, or vaccines to the WHO during a public health emergency or pandemic. Questions remain about how robust those donations would be, but the principle is that they should deliver highly significant lifesaving benefits to be equitably shared. Theoretically, this approach mirrors the PIP Framework, in which companies withdrawing influenza samples are required to pay half of the operating costs. In practice, however, the framework has fallen short. The PIP Framework Secretariat has struggled to secure payments from companies, with companies often disagreeing over how much is owed. Additionally, without another pandemic influenza to test the strength of the agreement during a public health emergency, corporate compliance with sharing mechanisms remains unknown. Even if these limitations did not characterize the PIP Framework, partially paying for operating expenses does not address the inequity in access to genetic data and pathogen samples that left less developed countries last in line for COVID-19 vaccines (and, before them, H1N1). Common but differentiated responsibilities would go further, addressing governments’ legitimate grievances regarding information sharing. It would make withdrawals of PABS material and resulting products more transparent, building trust across the board. Enforcement and Enduring Success A key implication of this approach is that the governing mechanism of the PABS must have real enforcement authority. The WHO Pandemic Agreement delegates its core governance responsibilities to a Conference of the Parties (COP)—a governing body composed of one representative from each participating government, similar to those established under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. The proposed WHO Pandemic Agreement COP is charged with oversight functions but ultimately possesses no real authority to compel a government to take any action it does not wish to take. The text does not give the COP the ability to, for example, sanction a party that does not comply with either textual obligations or PABS provisions. In other words, there are no effective mechanisms in place to ensure compliance. Perhaps just as significant, establishing a meaningful enforcement mechanism within the PABS system would strengthen the WHO’s credibility and its ability to ensure compliance across global health governance. By setting a precedent for accountability, such a mechanism could enhance the organization’s authority not only within the Pandemic Agreement but also in enforcing the revised International Health Regulations and other frameworks for public health emergencies. Conclusion The PABS annex can—and should—be different. It should establish clear responsibilities for funding as well as for sharing the diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines that result from contributions to the system. The system, in turn, must include a dedicated body empowered to hold governments and the corporations they sponsor accountable for their responsibilities before, during, and after pandemics. Doing so would restore trust in the broader agreement, which was eroded as commitments were repeatedly diluted while parties scrambled to meet their own self-imposed deadlines during the Pandemic Agreement negotiations. A robust PABS Annex would cement a grand social bargain. Wealthier countries and their corporations would gain unimpeded access to scientific information essential for developing and manufacturing lifesaving medical products. As such, they would stand to gain considerable economic benefit. Yet that privilege must be matched with responsibility. The grand bargain must include not only the right to innovate, but also the duty to ensure that innovation serves all. As medical products are developed and produced through collective contributions, every person must have equal access. All human beings deserve an equitable chance to survive—to save their own life, the lives of their families, and the well-being of their communities. … Sam Halabi, JD, MPhil, is the Bette Jacobs Endowed Professor at Georgetown University’s School of Health and the Director of the Center for Transformational Health Law at Georgetown Law. He serves as the co-lead for the WHO’s Working Group on Regulatory Consideration on AI and Health’s training workstream. He earned his JD from Harvard, his MPhil from Oxford, and undergraduate degrees from Kansas State University. Lawrence Gostin, LLD (Hon.), JD, BA, is University Distinguished Professor and Founding Director and Timothy and Linda O’Neill Professor of the O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law. He is the author of Global Health Security: A Blueprint for the Future (Harvard University Press, 2021); Global Health Law (Harvard University Press, 2014); Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint (University of California Press, 3rd ed., 2016); Public Health Law and Ethics: A Reader (University of California Press, 3rd ed., 2018); Law and the Health System (Foundation Press, 2014); Principles of Mental Health Law & Practice (Oxford University Press, 2010). He also directs the WHO Collaborating Center at Georgetown University. Image Credit: United States Mission Geneva, CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons

gjia.georgetown.edu logo
Dec 11, 2025 • 12:00 AM EST • Health • gjia.georgetown.edu